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Hrvatin: Criminal Procedure

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

UNITED STATES v. NORDBY,
225 F.3D 1053 (9TH CIR. 2000)
I. INTRODUCTION

In Apprendi v. New Jersey,! the United States Supreme
Court held that other than the fact of a prior conviction,2 any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum to which a defendant is exposed
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond' a reasonable
doubt. 3 The Apprendi decision has had its most significant im1 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). At the time of publishing, official pagination for Apprendi v. New Jersey was unavailable. All citations to Apprendi, therefore, will reference pagination as provided in the Supreme Court Reporter.
2 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998). In Almendarez-Torres, the United States Supreme Court upheld a conviction and sentence
where the sentence was increased from two to twenty years based on a prior conviction. See id. at 226-227. Almendarez-Torres involved the constitutionality of a provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which authorizes an increased prison sentence for an alien who has re-entered the United States
after deportation if there is evidence of a prior aggravated felony. See id. at 227. Even
though the fact of prior conviction had not been charged in the indictment nor the issue submitted to the jury, the Court noted that "recidivism ... is a traditional, if not
the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's [decision tol increas[el an offender's sentence." See id. at 243. In Apprendi, the Court left Almendarez-Torres untouched. See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362. The Court in Apprendi retained an exception for recidivism, finding that prior convictions can serve as the basis for a sentence
enhancement exceeding that sustainable by the facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 2362-2363. It is noteworthy, however, that AlmendarezTorres was a five-to-four decision in which Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter and Ginsberg, dissented. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248. Justice
Thomas, who cast the fifth and deciding vote in Almendarez-Torres, stated in Apprendi that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided. See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2379
(Thomas, J. concurring).
3 See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-2363. In Apprendi,. the state convicted Charles
Apprendi of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose after firing several shots
from a rifle into the home of a neighbor. See id. at 2351-2352. Under New Jersey law,
Mr. Apprendi faced imprisonment of five to ten years for the second-degree offense.
See id. at 2352. At sentencing, however, a judge found by a preponderance of the evi-
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pact in drug-trafficking cases, where judges rather than juries
traditionally make findings of fact as to drug quantities at
sentencing pursuant to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently applied the rationale of Apprendi to drugtrafficking cases under 21 U.S.C. § 841 in United States v.
Nordby.5 The Nordby court held that a finding of drug quantity under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)6 by the district court at sentencdence that Mr. Apprendi's crime was motivated by racial bias, a finding that increased Mr. Apprendi's sentence under New Jersey's hate-crime law to imprisonment
between ten and twenty years. See id. Mr. Apprendi was sentenced to twelve years
imprisonment. See id. The Court framed the question presented as "whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination
authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from [ten) to
[twenty) years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
See id. at 2351. The Court reversed the trial court, holding that the increase in the
prescribed statutory maximum penalty to which Mr. Apprendi was exposed violated
Mr. Apprendi's constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because
the factual determination that had served to elevate his maximum statutory exposure had not been submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
at 2362-2363.
4 The most famous definition of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was
that of Chief Justice Shaw, instructing the jury in Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush.
295, 320, 52 Am.Dec. 711 (Mass. 1850):
[R)easonable doubt ... is a term often used, probably pretty well understood,
but not easily defined. It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
[d. Expressed more recently by the Court, reasonable doubt exists when jurors lack
"a subjective state of near certitude of the result of guilt of the accused." Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979). On the other
hand, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, applied most often in civil cases,
is evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is
offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact
sought to be proved is more probable than not. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed.
1990).
5 See 225 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000). The appeal from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, Judge Vaughn R. Walker presiding, was argued and submitted on July 10, 2000 before Circuit Judges Canby,
Reinhardt, and Fernandez. See id. at 1053, 1056. Judge Canby authored the opinion.
See id. at 1056. Judge Reinhardt filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 1062-1063.
6 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994). Section 841(b) is the provision through which
penalties are assessed for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). See id. Section 841(a) pro-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss1/7

2

Hrvatin: Criminal Procedure

2001]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

107

ing pursuant to a preponderance of the evidence violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment7 and the notice
and jury-trial guarantees of the Sixth AmendmentS when drug
quantity was used to increase the prescribed statutory maximum penalty. 9 In requiring that drug quantity be submitted
to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Ninth
Circuit overruled nearly fifteen years of its own precedent.lO
vides that" ... it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally (1) to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance." See 21 U.S.C. §
841(a) (1994).
7 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[nlo person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ... and ... be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

9 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1056. The "prescribed statutory maximum" refers to
the punishment to which the defendant is exposed solely under the facts found by the
jury. See id. at 1059.
10 See id., at 1059. The Nordby decision effectively overruled Ninth Circuit precedent inconsistent with Apprendi. See United States v. Brinton, 139 F.3d 718, 722 (9th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Alerta, 96 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Baker, 10
F.3d 1374, 1417 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 769 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Sotelo-Rivera, 931 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Rosales, 917 F.2d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Walker, 915
F.2d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Klein, 860 F.2d 1489, 1494-1495 (9th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 391-392 (9th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Normandeau, 800 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1986). Even more, the Ninth Circuit in Nordby joined the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding
that prosecutions under Section 841 require the government to submit the fact of
drug quantity to a jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt if the government
seeks to impose a sentence enhancement under either 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(l)(A) or 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). See United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-165 (5th Cir.
2000); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 542-543 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933-934 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Aguayo-Delgado
v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 600 (2000); United States v. Jones, 2000 WL 1854077, *3
(lOth Cir. 2000); United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000).
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II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The police arrested Kayle Nordby on September 28, 1993,
after federal and state officers found thirty-one outdoor marijuana gardens containing 2,308 marijuana plants on two parcels of property owned by Mr. Nordby in Humboldt County,
California. l l Mr. Nordby was indicted for possessing and manufacturing marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)12 and conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 13
At trial, the district court did not instruct the jury to determine the amount of marijuana that Mr. Nordby actually
manufactured, possessed, or conspired to possess with intent
to distribute. 14 Instead, the district court instructed the jury
that "the government is not required to prove the amount or
quantity of marijuana manufactured as long as the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that [Mr. Nordby]
manufactured a measurable or detectable amount of marijuana."15 The jury convicted Mr. Nordby on all three counts. 16
At sentencing, Mr. Nordby admitted that he had grown
some marijuana on the property in question in 1992 and the
spring of 1993. 17 He challenged, however, the amount of marijuana that the government sought to attribute to him during
11 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1056. The authorities searched four properties in all.
See id. In addition to the 2,308 marijuana plants found on Mr. Nordby's property, the
police also discovered an indoor growing shed that had been used to grow marijuana.
See id. The police subsequently arrested Mr. Nordby, as well as co-defendants Cory
Marchese, Terry Medd, Jeb Stafslien, and Sam Stafslien. See id.
12 See id. at 1056. Section 841(a)(1) provides that" ... it shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . " Id. The counts for manufacture and possession with intent to distribute charged Mr. Nordby with 2,308 plants of marijuana. See Nordby, 225 F.3d at
1056.
13 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1056. Section 846 provides that "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject
to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which
was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). The conspiracy charged in the indictment was alleged to have run from "on or about August I,
1993 [to) on or about September 28, 1993." See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1056.
14 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1056.
16 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id.
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the alleged conspiracy charged in the indictment. IS Nevertheless, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Mr. Nordby had grown 1,000 or more marijuana plants. 19 As a
result, Mr. Nordby was exposed to a statutory minimum sentence of ten years in prison and a statutory maximum of life
in prison. 20 The district court sentenced Mr. Nordby to the
ten-year minimum penalty.21
Mr. Nordby appealed his conviction and sentence to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 22 The
18 See id. at 1056-1057. In particular, Mr. Nordby insisted that his partnership
with the Stafslien brothers to grow marijuana in 1992 had dissolved by 1993. See id.
at 1056. Mr. Nordby further admitted that he had conspired with Mr. Marchese to
grow about 200 marijuana plants indoors in 1993, but asserted that this conspiracy
ended by June 1993. See id. To support his contention, Mr. Nordby asserted that he
and Mr. Marchese had been in Minnesota and Costa Rica from late July 1993 until
five days before their arrest on September 28, 1993. See id. at 1056-1057. Finally,
Mr. Nordby contended that unknown ~guerilla growers" were responsible for planting
and tending other gardens charged in the indictment. See id. at 1057. He claimed
that this practice of maintaining "guerilla gardens" was common in Humboldt
County, and that he should not be held responsible for any marijuana found in these
gardens. See id.
19 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1057. The district court applied United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 1B1.3 to determine the amount of marijuana
for which Mr. Nordby was responsible. See id. at 1057. See U.S. SENTENCING MMOUAL
§ 181.3(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1998). This section is entitled "Relevant Conduct (Factors that
Determine the Guideline Range)" and it provides in pertinent part that:
[Tlhe base offense level ... shall be determined on the basis of ... (A) all acts
and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully cased by defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation of that offense, or in the
course of attempting to avoid detection for that offense ...
See id.
20 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1057. Mr. Nordby was sentenced according to 21
U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). See id. Under Section 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), "any person who violates [Section 841(a)] involving ... 1,000 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, or 1,000 or more marijuana
plants regardless of weight ... such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more than life ..." See 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (1994).
21 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1057.
22 See id. at 1057. To be clear, Mr. Nordby appealed twice to the Ninth Circuit.
The focus of this case summary is Mr. Nordby's second appeal in which he challenged
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court affirmed Mr. Nordby's conviction but vacated his sentence and' remanded for re-sentencing on the ground that the
district court had made insufficient factual findings at sentencing. 23 On remand, the district court determined again that
Mr. Nordby was responsible for 1,000 or more marijuana
plants under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) and sentenced Mr.
Nordby to ten years.24 Mr. Nordby appealed his re-sentencing
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 25
only his re-sentencing. See id. at 1057. In his first appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Mr.
Nordby contested both his conviction and sentence on several grounds. See United
States v. Nordby, 156 F.3d 1240, 1998 WL 476113, *2-10 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished
opinion). First, Mr. Nordby claimed that the search warrant issued to search his
property was invalid. See id. at *2-4. Second, he argued that the district court improperly admitted hearsay, which violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. See id. at *4-5. Third, Mr. Nordby alleged that the Assistant United
States Attorney engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting perjury, impermissibly vouching for the credibility of a witness, and making improper statements during
closing arguments. See id. at *5-8. 'Mr. Nordby challenged his original sentence by arguing that the district court failed to make factual findings regarding the number of
plants for which he was responsible. See id. at *8-9. More specifically, Mr. Nordby alleged that he should not have been held accountable for 1,000 or more marijuana
plants because he had not agreed to grow some of the plants, he could not have foreseen that his co-defendants would grow some of the plants, and unknown growers
had grown some of the plants. See id. at *9 (citations omitted).
23 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1057. The Ninth Circuit found a number of faults
with the district court's determination of Mr. Nordby's sentence. See id. (citing
Nordby, 1998 WL at *9-10) (unpublished opinion). The district court's analysis failed
to explain why the facts it relied upon could not have applied to a smaller 1992 conspiracy rather than the large 1993 conspiracy charged in the indictment. See Nordby,
1998 WL at *9. Moreover, the Ninth Court considered the fact that Mr. Nordby recruited his co-defendants insufficient to explain why he should have been held responsible for the marijuana plants the co-defendants grew after they allegedly ended
their conspiracy, nor did it answer the assertion that Mr. Nordby could not have foreseen that his co-defendants would increase the scale of the drug-trafficking operation.
See id. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court failed to explain why
Mr. Nordby's loan to the Stafslien brothers meant that he could have foreseen that
they would grow increased amounts of marijuana. See id. The district court also
failed to address the argument that unknown individuals grew some of the plants.
See id. In finding that the pre-sentence investigation report on which the district
court relied did not provide greater specificity, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
district court's comments were "general and conclusory statement[s) [that) f1e)ll[ )
short of the specificity required [in a drug-trafficking case like this one.)" See id. at
*9-10 (quoting United States v. Conkins, 9 F.3d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1993».
24 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1057. See also supra text accompanying note 20.
25 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1057.
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THE NINTH CIRCillT'S ANALYSIS

A. ApPRENDI
U.S.C. § 841

,ApPLIES TO SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS UNDER

21

In Apprendi v. New Jersey,26 the United States Supreme
Court held that the determination of "sentencing factors" by a
judge using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard violated
a defendant's right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. 27
The Court in Jones v. United States 28 first hinted to these constitutional concerns. 29 In Jones, however, the Court avoided
the constitutional implications subsequently addressed in Apprendi, and construed the serious-bodily-injury penaltyenhancement provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2119,30 the federal carjacking statute, to establish separate offenses that must be
charged by indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. 31 In Apprendi, on the
other hand, the Court directly addressed the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment concerns. 32 Accordingly, the Nordby court considered whether drug quantity was a sentencing factor or an element of the underlying crime under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).33 A corollary issue was whether the determination of drug quantity
increased the maximum penalty to which Mr. Nordby was exposed for the underlying crime of drug trafficking charged in
the indictment. 34
120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
See id. at 2362-2363. See also supra text accompanying notes 3, 7 and 8.
28 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
29 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
30 Section 2119 provides " [wjhoever, with the intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by. force and
violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall ... be fined ... or imprisoned
not more than fifteen years, or both . . . if serious bodily injury . . . results, be
fined . . . or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both, and ... if death
results, be fined ... or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or sentenced to
death." 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
31 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-252.
32 See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2355.
33 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1058.
34 See id. at 1059.
26
27
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The court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent to find that
Congress did not intend drug quantity to be an element of the
crime under Section 841(a).35 Ninth Circuit precedent also
states that a judge, not a jury, decides drug quantity under a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, regardless of the impact of drug quantity on the applicable sentencing range. 36
The Ninth Circuit held that Section 841 plainly distinguished
between elements and sentencing factors.37 The court found
that Section 841(a) does not contain prescribed maximum or
minimum sentences for violations of the statute. 3S Rather,
Section 841(b) assesses penalties for violations of Section
841(a), and any person who violates Section 841(a) is sentenced according to the quantity of the controlled substance
for which the defendant is charged. 39 The court concluded,
therefore, that Congress clearly intended that drug quantity
be a sentencing factor, not an element of the crime under Section 841(a), and that the statute could not be construed in a
manner to avoid the constitutional issues raised by Apprendi. 40 Once the court extended the rationale of Apprendi to
drug-trafficking crimes under Section 841(a), its "application
of Apprendi [to the facts of Mr. Nordby's case was]
straightforward. "41
In Nordby, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the jury had
been instructed that possession of any "measurable or detectable amount of marijuana" was sufficient to warrant a finding
of guilt. 42 The jury made no finding regarding the specific
amount of marijuana that Mr. Nordby manufactured, pos35 See id. at 1058 (citing Sotelo-Rivera, 931 F.2d at 1319) "Section 841(a) does not
specify drug quantity as an element of the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute; quantity is instead relevant to the penalty provisions of Section
841(b), and is a matter for the district court at sentencing." [d.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 1058.
38 See id. Section 841(a) is entitled "Unlawful acts." [d. See also supra text accompanying note 6.
39 See 21 U.S.C. 841(b). Section 841(b) is entitled "Penalties" and states that "any
person who violates [Section 841(a)] shall be sentenced [as Section 841(b)
prescribes.)" [d.
40 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1058. The Ninth Circuit found Section 841(a) to stand
on its "own grammatical feet." [d. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 233-234).
41 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1058.
42 See id. at 1058-1059.
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sessed with intent to distribute, or conspired to possess with
intent to distribute. 43 Instead, the jury found merely that Mr.
Nordby conspired and possessed marijuana with the intent to
distribute. 44 Therefore, the fact of drug quantity could not,
pursuant to Apprendi, be used by the district court to enhance the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum to which Mr. Nordby was exposed. 45
In this way, although Section 841(a) does not contain penalty provisions,46 the court stated that the only sentence
under Section 841(b) justifiable under the facts as found by
the jury would have been a sentence (and possible fine) of not
more than five years applicable to possession of less than fifty
plants of marijuana. 47 The district court's finding, however,
that Mr. Nordby possessed 1,000 or more marijuana plants increased the penalty for Mr. Nordby's crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. 48 That is, the district court's finding that Mr. Nordby possessed 1,000 or more plants under
Section 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) increased Mr. Nordby's sentence to
not less than 10 years or more than life. 49 Thus, the district
court's finding, made by a preponderance of the evidence, increased the statutory maximum penalty for Mr. Nordby's
crime from five years to life. 50
See id. at 1058.
See id.
45 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059.
46 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
47 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D». Section
84l(b)(1)(D) provides in pertinent part that "[iJn the case of less than 50 kilograms of
marijuana, except in the case of 50 or more marijuana plants regardless of
weight . . . such person shall . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
more than 5 years ... " 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (1994). Section 841(b)(1)(D) exists as
a catchall penalty provision in drug-trafficking indictments for, among other types of
drugs, marijuana, where the prosecution does not charge a specific quantity of marijuana as required for the enhanced penalties provided in Section 841(b)(1)(A) or Section 841(b)(1)(B). See id.
48 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1058-1059.
49 See id. at 1059.
50 See id. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument that Section 841
contains "no prescribed statutory maximum," and that, therefore, Apprendi does not
apply to Mr. Nordby's case. See id. Under Apprendi, the "prescribed statutory maximum" refers to the punishment to which the defendant is exposed solely under the
facts found by the jury. See id. The district court's finding of drug quantity increased
the maximum penalty to which Mr. Nordby was exposed and sentenced. See id. The
43

44
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The court held that such a penalty enhancement was inconsistent with the constitutional rule expressed in Apprendi. 51 Hence, the court concluded that the district court
had erred by sentencing Mr. Nordby under Section 841(b) for
possessing and manufacturing marijuana with intent to distribute 1,000 or more marijuana plants without submitting
the question of marijuana quantity to the jury for a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt. 52

B.

THE COURT'S PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW

At the time of Mr. Nordby's re-sentencing, neither Jones
v. United States 53 nor Apprendi v. New Jersey54 had been decided. 55 Mr. Nordby, therefore, did not specifically object to the
district court's determination under a preponderance of the
evidence of the amount of marijuana for which he was held
responsible. 56 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit could afford Mr.
Nordby relief if the district court's error was "plain."57 The sigNinth Circuit, therefore, did not have to decide whether the increase in statutory
minimum sentence also fell within the scope of Apprendi. See Nordby, 225 F.3d at
1059 n.3 (citing Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2363. "[Ilt is unconstitutional for a legislature
to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." See id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S.
at 252-253 (Stevens, J. concurring).
51 See id.
52 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059. In so applying the constitutional rule expressed
in Apprendi, the Ninth Circuit overruled its existing precedent that had previously
held that a defendant's sentence under Section 841 could be based on a judge's finding at sentencing of drug quantity under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
See id.; see also cases cited supra note 10.
53 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
54 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
55 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059. Mr. Nordby'S case went to the Ninth Circuit on
direct review, so there was 'no question that he was entitled to the benefit of Apprendi's new rule decided after his re-sentencing. See id. (citing Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987». Griffith mandates that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending
on direct review or not yet final." See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
56 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059-1060.
57 See id. at 1060 (citing FED. R. CRIM, P. 52(b)). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that "[p)lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought attention to the court." [d. Under the plainerror standard, reversal is appropriate where: (1) there was "error;" (2) the error was
"plain;" and (3) the error affected the defendant's "substantial rights." See id. at 1060
(citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993». If the first three elements of
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nificance of the court's plain-error review inheres in its conclusion that the district court erred by finding that Mr.
Nordby was responsible for 1,000 or more marijuana plants.58
The district court's finding could not stand pursuant to Apprendi since drug quantity was used to increase Mr. Nordby's
sentence beyond the maximum penalty charged in the indictment. 59 The court considered it "enough that the Apprendi error [was] 'plain' at the time of [Mr. Nordby's] appeal," to the
extent that drug quantity was not submitted to the jury for a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 60
The Ninth Circuit then decided whether the district
court's failure to submit the question of drug quantity to the
jury affected Mr. Nordby's "substantial rights."61 The court
noted that there are two approaches to the substantial-rights
inquiry under plain-error review. 62 First, the court can weigh
the extra sentence imposed upon a defendant beyond that
permitted by the jury's verdict. 63 In Nordby, the court recognized that the jury convicted Mr. Nordby of violating Section
841(a)(1) without making a specific finding as to the amount
of drugs involved. 64 Yet, at sentencing, the district court imposed an additional five years of imprisonment. 65 The court
found that such a result affected Mr. Nordby's substantial
rights if the actual quantity was less than 1,000 plants of marijuana, "since a longer sentence undoubtedly affects substanthe test are met, the court may exercise its discretion to notice the forfeited error, so
long as the error (4) "seriously affect[sl the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings." See id.
68 See id. at 1060.
69 See id. at 1059. "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct.
at 2362-2363.
60 See id. at 1060 (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997);
United States v. Turman, 122 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 1997)).
61 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1060 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732).
62 See id. at 1060.
63 See id.
64 See id. Mr. Nordby, therefore, could not receive more than five years imprisonment. [d.
66 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1060. The additional sentence was based on the district court's conclusion that Mr. Nordby possessed 1,000 or more marijuana plants.
See id.
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tial rights."66 Second, under a more stringent approach, drug
quantity can be treated as an element of the offense on which
the jury was not instructed. 67 Under this standard, the court
conducts a harmless-error analysis as to whether it was "clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
found the defendant guilty absent the error."68 If the error was
harmless, Mr. Nordby's substantial rights could not have been
affected. 69 The error would have been harmless if no rational
jury could have concluded that Mr. Nordby was responsil;>le
for less than 1,000 marijuana plants. 70
The Ninth Circuit did not choose which approach to apply
on the ground that Mr. Nordby satisfied the more stringent
standard of the substantial-rights inquiry.71 The court found
that the record left little room for doubt that Mr. Nordby was
prejudiced by the failure to submit drug quantity to the jury
because the jury could not have found more than fifty marijuana plants.72 The court noted that Mr. Nordby consistently
66 See id. at 1060 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 201 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th
Cir. 2000».
67 See id. at 1060. "Despite the functional equivalence between an element of the
crime and a sentencing factor that increases the prescribed statutory maximum beyond that permissible on the facts as found by a jury, [the Ninth Circuit does] not
necessarily equate the two for all purposes." See id. at 1060 n.5 (citing Apprendi, 120
S.Ct. at 2365 & n.19).
66 See id. 1060. The harmless-error standard was articulated in Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. I, 17 (1999). In Neder, the defendant was charged with, among other
things, filing false federal income tax returns. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 6. The defendant challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the element of materiality with regard to the tax fraud charge. See id. Applying harmless-error principles to
the defendant's claim, the United States Supreme Court held that a jury instruction
that improperly omits an essential element from the charge constitutes harmless error if a reviewing court "concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error ... " See id. at 17. Accordingly,
the test for determining whether harmless error results from the failure to instruct
on an element in a criminal case is as follows: It appears beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. See id.
69 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1060 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734) (the harmlesserror and substantial-rights inquiries are the same except that the defendant bears
the burden of proof in the latter).
70 See id. at 1060.
7) See id.
72 See id. The Ninth Circuit's review of Mr. Nordby's sentence encompassed the
"whole record." See id. at 1061 n.6 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681
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maintained that he was not responsible for growing all of the
2,000 plants found on his property, or for conspiring to do so
at the time charged in the indictment. 73 At sentencing, when
the amount of marijuana Mr. Nordby would be responsible for
became relevant, Mr. Nordby presented additional evidence
that suggested that he did not grow or participate in the conspiracy to grow all the marijuana found on his land. 74
After reviewing all· the evidence, the court held that Mr.
Nordby had contested the omitted element of drug quantity
and raised evidence sufficient to support a finding that he
was not responsible for 1,000 or more plants of marijuana. 75
Mr. Nordby had met his burden of proving that the district
(1986». The Ninth Circuit looked at Mr. Nordby's sentencing proceedings as well as
his briefing on appeal in order to determine what evidence Mr. Nordby would have
introduced at trial on the question of drug quantity had the issue been submitted to
the jury. See id. at 1061 n.6. The court, however, made it clear that it would not "consider any admissions made by [Mr. Nordby) at sentencing in assessing the prejudice
suffered by [Mr. Nordby) because of the Apprendi error." See id. The harmless-error/
substantial-rights inquiry is directed at whether the error affected the jury's verdict,
that is, whether the appellate court concludes "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." See id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967». Accordingly, any new admissions made by
Mr. Nordby at sentencing after the jury had already rendered its verdict were considered irrelevant. See id. at 1061 n.6.
73 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1060. Although Mr. Nordby's counsel had admitted at
trial that Mr. Nordby had grown relatively small amounts of marijuana in the past,
Mr. Nordby had never conceded that he had been part of the conspiracy to grow and
distribute marijuana in August and September of 1993. See id. at 1060-1061. The
Ninth Circuit found persuasive that Mr. Nordby himself did not live on the land in
question, and had been vacationing for much of the time that the marijuana crop had
been in the ground, and only returned to Humboldt County five days before he was
arrested on September 28, 1993. See id. at 1060.
74 See id. at 1061. More specifically, Mr. Nordby presented evidence that he had
conspired in 1992 with the Stafslien brothers to grow marijuana outside on Mr.
Nordby's land, but that this conspiracy ended by the beginning of 1993. See id. He
presented evidence that the amount of marijuana grown in the 1992 conspiracy was
considerably less than that grown in 1993, and that it was not reasonably foreseeable
that the Stafslien brothers would grow such a large amount of marijuana on his land
in 1993. See id. Mr. Nordby further presented evidence that he had conspired with
Mr. Marchese to grow approximately 200 marijuana plants indoors, but that this conspiracy ended by June 1993. See id. Finally, Mr. Nordby presented evidence regarding the size, location and growing methods used in the thirty-one gardens that could
have permitted an inference that some of the gardens were tended by "guerilla gardeners" who were not arrested at all. See id.
75 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1061 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 19).

.
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court's error prejudiced him, for he received a sentence five
years longer than the maximum he could have received had
he been sentenced on the facts as found by the jury.76 Accordingly, the court determined that since Mr. Nordby had
"demonstrated more than a reasonable doubt that he was responsible for possessing or manufacturing 1,000 or more marijuana plants in August and September 1993,"77 the Apprendi
error affected the outcome of Mr. Nordby's trial, which affected his substantial rights under the plain-error standard. 78
Next, the court concluded that the district court's failure
to submit drug quantity to the jury for a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings."79 Our constitutional system of justice was built on the rights to jury trial
and a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 80 The
court determined that the fairness of that system was undermined when a court's error "impose[s] a longer sentence than
might have been imposed had the court not plainly erred."81
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated Mr. Nordby's sentence. 82 The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court for
re-sentencing subject to the maximum sentence supported by
the facts found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 83
76

See id. at 1061.

77Id.

See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1061 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).
See id. at 1061 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732).
60 See id. at 1061 (citing Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2355-2356).
81 See id. at 1061 (quoting United States v. Castillo-Casiano, 198 F.3d 787, 792
(9th Cir. 1999), amended by, 204 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2000».
62 See id. at 1061-1062.
83 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1062. In considering the appropriate procedure on remand, the Ninth Circuit recognized that in cases in which the jury's finding does not
support the defendant's sentence, and where the conviction as well as the sentence
are on appeal, the Ninth Circuit has given the government the opportunity to accept
a re-sentencing of the defendant to the lesser term permitted by the jury's findings.
See id. If the government so chooses, the conviction is affirmed and the defendant is
. re-sentenced subject to the lower maximum sentence. See id. If the government does
not so choose, a new trial is ordered. See id. at 1062 (citing United States v. Garcia,
37 F.3d 1359, 1371 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Alerta, 96 F.3d 1230, 1236 (9th
Cir. 1996». In Mr. Nordby's case, however, since he appealed only his re-sentencing,
his conviction was not properly before the court. See id. at 1062. On that ground, the
Ninth Circuit was not presented with the option of ordering a retrial of a conviction
that Mr. Nordby accepted as final. See id. The court did not express an opinion as to
76

79
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C. JunGE REINHARDT'S CONCURRENCE

Judge Reinhardt wrote separately to discuss in more detail the "substantial rights" element of the standard for plain
error. 84 He focused on the. nature and basis of the less stringent standard of substantial-rights review, a discussion that
the court was not required to develop because .Mr. Nordby
demonstrated that his substantial rights were affected under
the more stringent Neder test for harmless error. 85 Judge
Reinhardt supplemented the court's analysis of substantialrights review to clarify the applicability of the less stringent
standard in future cases. 86
As opposed to the Neder standard of review, the less
stringent standard does not involve a review. of the evidence
not considered by the jury to try to determine what the jury
could have concluded had it been properly instructed. 87
Rather, it requires invalidation of the sentence simply because the verdict reached by the jury does not support the imposition of a sentence greater than five years. 88 Judge Reinhardt presented two alternative theories that underlie the
less stringent standard. and its rejection of the Neder approach. 89 Under the first rationale, a defendapt must be convicted of the crime for which he is sentenced. 90 Mr. Nordby
whether offering an option to the government would be a permissible or appropriate
remedy in this case if it were available. See id. at 1062 n.7. Finally, because of the
Ninth Circuit's disposition of Mr. Nordby's Apprendi claim; it declined to address his
claim that the district court made insufficient factual findings at 'sentencing under
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. See id . at 1062 n.8.
84 See id. at 1062-1063. See supra text accompanying note 57.
85 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1060. Under the Neder approach, the court treats
drug quantity as an element of the offense on which the jury was not instructed and
thereafter conducts a harmless-error analysis as to whether it was "clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent
the error." See id. at 1060 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 19). The defendant's substantial
rights cannot be affected if the error was harmless. See id. at 1060 (citing Olano, 507
U.S. at 734).
88 See id at 1062-1063. The opinion for the court in Nordby did not specify which
approach to the substantial-rights inquiry should be applied·in future cases. See id.
at 1060.
87 See id. at 1062.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1062. Judge Reinhardt distinguished Neder from the
facts in Nordby by noting that the defendant in Neder was sentenced for the crime of
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had been charged with violating Section 841(a), a crime that
carries, without a greater specification as to a quantity of marijuana, a five-year maximum sentence. 91 The court, however,
sentenced Mr. Nordby to ten years of imprisonment. 92 Judge
Reinhardt found that for a defendant who grows marijuana to
receive more than five years imprisonment, he must be convicted of growing 1,000 or more marijuana plants in violation
of Section 841(a) and Section 841(b)(1)(A).93 Simply growing a
detectable amount of marijuana in violation of Section 841(a)
or Section 841(a) and Section 841(b)(1)(D) imports a sentence
not to exceed five years. 94 Accordingly, the trial court violated
Mr. Nordby's substantial rights because he was not convicted
of the crime for which he was sentenced. 95
Judge Reinhardt then explained the second rationale of
the less stringent standard, which finds it improper to weigh
evidence that the jury did not consider when the missing element is central to the offense. 96 He concluded that the second
rationale would be applicable in cases like Mr. Nordby's,
where, for sentencing purposes, the particular offense depends
entirely on the quantity of drugs, and drug quantity, therefore, is a central element of the crime. 97
The application of the less stringent approach, under either rationale, would result in the same conclusion in Mr.
Nordby's case, for the failure of the jury to determine drug
quantity was not harmless regardless of what the record disclosed regarding the amount of marijuana for which Mr.
which the jury convicted him. See id. at 1062 (citing Neder, 527, U.S. at 6). Mr.
Nordby, on the other hand, was not convicted of the crime for which he was sentenced. See id.
91 See note 47 and accompanying text.
92 See note 20 and accompanying text.
93 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1062 (citing Anderson, 201 F.3d at 1152) (emphasis in
original).
94 See id. (emphasis in original). See also supra note 47.
95 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1062 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 6).
96 See id. at 1062. According to Judge Reinhardt, although "the Neder opinion
makes clear that its scope is limited," the opinion does not articulate "the nature of
the rule's boundaries." See id. (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 17 n.2 (Scalia, J. dissenting».
Still, the basis of the second rationale is that where the element the jury failed to
consider is central to the existence of an offense, the omission of the element falls
outside the scope of Neder's harmless-error review. See id. at 1062.
97 See id. at 1062.
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Nordby could have been found culpable. 98 Thus, Judge Reinhardt concluded that Mr. Nordby's substantial rights had been
violated pursuant to the less stringent standard as well. 99

IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

If the government seeks penalties in excess of those applicable by virtue of the elements of the offense alone, the gov~rnment must allege the facts giving rise to the increased
sentence in the indictment and prove those facts to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. loO Under 21 U.S.C. § 841, when drug
quantity increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, the fact of drug quantity must be
charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and proved
by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. lol The prosecution's failure to do so would violate the constitutional rule expressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey and affirmed in United
States v. Nordby; otherwise, drug quantity would be the "tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense."102
The implications of Nordby, at first glance, appear dramatic. Nordby can be interpreted to require prosecutors to
charge drug quantities and prove those quantities to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt in all drug-trafficking cases. The
holding of Nordby, however, is narrow. 103 In cases where the·
defendant's sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum,
even if the district court by a preponderance of the evidence
made a finding as to drug quantity, Nordby does not apply:lo4
See id. at 1063.
See id.
100 See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-2363.
101 See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059; Doggett, 230 F.3d at 164-165; Page, 232 F.3d at
542-543; Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d at 933-934; Jones, 2000 WL at *3; Rogers, 228
F.3d at 1327.
102 See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243 (quoting McMillan v. United States,
477 U.S. 69, 88 (1999».
loa See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059.
104 The First and Eighth Circuits have already distinguished Nordby. See United
States v. LaFreniere, 236 F.3d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 2001) (distinguishing Nordby and finding no Apprendi error where determination of quantity of heroin by judge rather
than jury did not cause defendant's sentence to exceed statutory maximum); see also
United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Nordby to
hold that Apprendi mandates reversal only when a finding of drug quantity by the
sentencing judge under a preponderance of the evidence results in a sentence exceed98

99
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Thus, a district court, pursuant to a preponderance of the evidence, may still alter a defendant's sentence within the range
allowed by statute so long as the sentence does not exceed the
maximum prescribed by statute. In Nordby, for example, had
the district court sentenced Mr. Nordby to five years imprisonment or less, he would not have had a claim under Apprendi. Under those circumstances, the fact of drug quantity
would not h~ve been used to enhance Mr. Nordby's sentence
beyond the statutory maximum prescribed by Section
841(b)( l)(D). 105 Accordingly, only if prosecutors seek enhanced
penalties beyond those maximum levels for unspecified quantities of controlled substances, will Nordby's holding require
prosecutors to charge specific drug quantities. lOG

Adriano Hrvatin *

ing statutory maximum prescribed for minimal or unspecified drug quantities).
106 See supra text accompanying note 47.
106 Presumably, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Nordby also does not prevent the
government from superceding its original indictment to allege drug quantities should
it decide to pursue enhanced penalties under either 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) or 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
* J.D. candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2002. "The cleverest of all, in my opinion, is the man who calls himself a fool at least once a month.»
Fyodor Dostoevski.
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